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The Sources of International Law
What are the sources of international law?
The earliest modern advocate of the law of
nations, Hugo Grotius, saw the ultimate
source of law in humanity's natural need for
social order, discovered and constructed by
human intelligence (Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli
ac Pacis Libri Tres (1625) at Prolegomena 8).
Grotius observed that justice is approved, and
injustice condemned, by good men everywhere (Prolegomena, 20). So he sought evidence of the law of nations in unbroken
custom and the views of skilled and reflective
authors throughout the ages (Grotius, I.xiv.2).
Just as municipal law arises from the mutual
consent of individuals seeking the good of
their community, so for Grotius international
law derived from the implicit consent of
states, 'seeking the good of the international
community as a whole (Prolegomena, 17).
Emmerich de Vattel also believed in national
duties to the universal society of the human
race (Emmerich de Vattel, Droit des gens (1758)
at Preliminaries § 11). In the treatise that did
most to promulgate the modern law of
nations, Vattel sought to clarify the proper role
of consent. States may create and alter some
of their duties by treaty or custom, but other
laws remain immutable components of the
necessary law of nations. Treaties or custom
contrary to these provisions are unlawful and
void (Vattel, Preliminaries § 26). Vattel identified
the law of nations with the law of nature, applied
to nations (Preliminaries § 6). The greatest
difficulty for international lawyers lies in
discovering its content, which is why Vattel
concluded that in making demands on other
states, nations should restrict themselves to
areas of general agreement (Preliminaries § 28
& III.xii.§§ 188-189).
The Statute of the International Court of
Justice reflects this same tension between
immutable justice and its discovery by fallible
human agents. Article 38 of the Court's statute
recognizes four authorities to be applied in
deciding cases according to international
law: international conventions; international
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custom; the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and the teachings
of the most highly qualified judges and
publicists. Centuries of practice had not
substantially altered the insights with which
modem international law began three hundred
years before.
The International Community
Both Grotius and Vattel spoke of creating
and preserving the "international community"
as a central purpose of international law.
Christian Wolf, Vattel's main source, went further in identifying a preexisting world
republic or "civitas maxima" as the source of
the law of nations (C. Wolff, Jus Gentium methodo
scientifica pertractatum (1749)). Some contemporary lawyers, such as Jonathan Chamey, see
the public interest of this "international
community" as-the central source of international law, without specifying too carefully
who makes up the international "community"
or why its interests should be paramount.
Traditional doctrine, going back to Grotius,
described international law as regulating a
community of states, just as municipal law
regulates the separate national communities
of citizens.
Vattel made the best argument for this
conception of international law: "Since men are
naturally equal, and a perfect equality prevails
in their rights and obligations, as equally
proceeding from nature, -- nations composed
of men, and considered as so many free
persons living together in the state of nature,
are naturally equal, and inherit from nature
the same obligations and rights." (Vattel,
Preliminaries § 18). It is an evident consequence of this liberty and independence of
nations, that "all have the right to be governed
as they think proper, and no state has the
smallest right to interfere in the government
of another" (Vattel at II.iv.§ 54). The traditional
conception of the international community is
of a community of states, regulating their
external affairs in pursuit of justice and the
common good of the nations and peoples that
they represent.
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More recently, a "realist" camp has arisen
among some lawyers, which sees international
law as a modus vivendi between competing
sovereigns, serving their mutual interests
without regard to justice or the needs of their
people. This view adopts Vattel's concept of a
community of states, and sees each state's
consent as the sole source of "law" regarding
its own international obligations. John Austin's
legal positivism lent this attitude a certain
respectability, by deriving all law from the
will of "sovereigns," identified as the governments of individual states. This differs from
traditional doctrine in emphasizing the will of
states as sources of law, rather than their shared
perceptions of justice or truth. But both
approaches agree in recognizing the importance
of states in determining the content of
international law.
International Conventions
The emphasis on conventions in the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, "establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states," follows naturally from Vattel's
view of states as free and independent representatives of the peoples of the world. Treaties
are the clearest possible expression of international consensus, and contract is one of the
most basic components of universal natural
justice. This is why so many since Grotius have
endorsed his basic principle that "pacta sunt
servanda" (Grotius, Prolegomena 15). If states
speak for peoples then (a) their shared
perceptions are likely to be true, and (b) their
commitments should bind them.
To speak of treaties as binding would tend
to vitiate the realist view of law as deriving from
the will or consent of states. Treaties bind, under
the usual doctrine, whether or not states still
endorse their original agreements. There is an
obvious utility in being able to rely on mutual
commitments, which usually out-weighs the
harm caused by respecting ill-considered or unjust agreements. As with contracts between
individuals, fundamental changes in circumstances diminish the obligation of the original
pact. Even brigands can accept these
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fundamental principles, which serve a basic
human interest in planning and coordination.
There will be limits, however, to the power
of treaties as sources of law if one looks
beyond the pretense that states are free and
equal representatives of free and equal citizens. Most states are not. Unequal treaties
imposed by force do not reflect the views of
the weaker party. Unjust treaties entered into
by undemocratic governments do not speak for
the peoples they purport to represent. There
may be prudential reasons for maintaining
such treaties after power changes hands, but the
ultimate source of "law" is not present to
make such conventions genuinely binding.

International Custom
Hugo Grotius (I.xiv.2) quoted Dio Chrysostom (Orations, lxxvi) for the proposition that
time and custom create the law of nations. The
reference in the I.C.J. Statute to international custom "as evidence of general practice accepted as law" reflects this very old
observation that custom reveals a natural
law proceeding from universal human
characteristics (Grotius, Prolegomena 12). Vattel
added that it may also reflect tacit consent, or a
tacit convention between states that observe
certain practices towards each other (Vattel,
Preliminaries § 25). Vattel considered this sort
of customary international law useful and
obligatory if reasonable, but not obligatory
otherwise, since nothing can oblige or
authorize a state to violate the natural law of
nations (Vattel, Preliminaries § 26).
Custom expresses the natural law of the
community of nations because consensus
naturally builds around rules made salient by
the intrinsic characteristics of human nature.
Where several solutions could equally provide
a viable rule, custom properly determines
which rule will govern future conflicts. Here
again custom does not express so much the
will of nations as their mutual recognition of
external and preexisting norms. Custom is
very good evidence of "natural law, applied
to nations."
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Custom need not be universal to bind
states, including dissenters, when it arises from
preexisting truths (the law of nature). Customcreated by states to facilitate their social and
mercantile interests derives their validity from
consent (Grotius, Prolegomena 40), and only
bind those who benefit from the practice
involved. So while it is true in a sense to say
that customs, like conventions, are generally
created by the international community to serve
erve its own interests, the interest involved is
the maintenance of social order (Grotius,
Prolegomena 8) and the advantage, not of
particular states, but of the whole society of states
throughout the world (Grotius, Prolegomena 17).
General Principles of Law
The general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations take on a special significance
for scholars who want to minimize the role of
states in international law. This is because they
arise among "nations" (not "states") and only
"civilized" nations have standing to create
them. In the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, these "principles" would seem to
be legal maxims accepted widely in the practices of more developed legal systems. To these
some would now add "proposals, reports,
resolutions, treaties or protocols" debated and
refined in modern multilateral forums such as
the United Nations (Charney II.B).
If all interested states participate in a
discussion of some area of law and reach
consensus, or even substantial agreement, the
standards thus generated would seem more
likely correctly to reflect the social norms and
justice that justify and create the law of
nations than would most conventions or
customs among states. The more open and selfconscious the process, the more valid the
norm. Sometimes a short-term consensus will
be able to generate norms that would be very
difficult to achieve through gradual evolution,
given the corruption and shifting self-interest
of states.
This quasi-legislative process of creating
general international law requires justification. Conventions and customs provide good
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evidence of international law because they
reflect the consent and perceptions of states,
which rest in turn on the consent and perceptions of their citizens and nationals. General principles of municipal law derive their validity in
much the same way. Multilateral forums
purporting to speak for the "international co mmunity" must offer a some such theory to justify their claim of authority. Direct democratic
participation through representatives who
speak for the common good offers the most
compelling claim to moral accuracy and legal
recognition. The smaller the democratic input,
the lower the validity of the norm.
Teachings of the Publicists
Judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of various
nations might seem to fail this democratic
test, even as a subsidiary means of determining the rules of international law. Their persistent importance, going back to Grotius, Wolf,
Pufendorf, Bynkershoek, Wheaton and the
Statute of the International Court of Justice,
among many other examples, reflects the
weakness, incoherence, corruption and democratic illegitimacy of most states during most
of the world's history. If international custom, conventions and the deliberations of
multilateral bodies derive their validity from
the consent or perceptions of the peoples
represented, then the participation of usurping governments and egregious tyrants
in creating such standards will undermine
their legitimacy. This creates the void that
publicists have stepped forward to fill.
What judges and publicists offer in determining the content of international law is impartiality. Without a personal stake in the
outcome of international conflicts, such figures
may be franker and more objective in working
out the obligations that arise from the community of states, or universal human society.
Their influence depends less on democratic
legitimacy than on the ability to state clearly
truths that, once uttered, cannot be easily suppressed. Judges and academics who owe their
positions to the patronage or sufferance of
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government officials will not speak or write
impartially, and deserve little deference in
determining the rules of international law.
It is doctrinaire nonsense to imagine that a
strict system of autonomous states ever
governed the creation of international law,
and well-intentioned nonsense to suppose
that the sources of international law have
changed much in recent years. What may have
changed is the efficacy of international law,
and the frequency with which such sources
are consulted. Claiming authority for
international law has always involved assertions of truth and justice. The role of
publicists may have decreased in recent
years, and multilateral forums proliferated,
but the sources of their authority continue as
before to be the truth of their doctrines and
the democratic legitimacy of those who
articulate them.

Difficulties arise in seeking to distinguish
jus cogens from other less fundamental rules of
international law, which states may restrict
by agreement. The examples usually offered
include prohibitions on genocide, racial discrimination, slavery, piracy, crimes against
humanity, and the use of force (Ian Brownlie,
The Principles of Public International Law
(4th ed. 1990) p. 513). All concern protecting individual rights against state malfeasance, with special emphasis on protecting
personal security and bodily integrity against
serious violations. Most proposed elements of
jus cogens protect what Vattel referred to as
the "universal society of the human race"
(Preliminaries § 11).
Erga Omnes

Jus Cogens
The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties recognizes the long asserted principle
of international law that (Art. 53): "A treaty is
void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law." For the purposes of the
Convention, a peremptory norm of general
international law ("jus cogens") is a "norm
accepted and recognized by the international
community of states as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted." This
corresponds to Vattel's category of laws that no
nation may create or recognize, because they
violate the laws of nature (Preliminaries § 26).

The "universal society of the human race"
may sometimes find itself at odds with the
"community of states," as is made most clear
by the doctrine of erga omnes, advanced by
theInternational Court of Justice in the
Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co. Case
(1970). In Barcelona Traction, the court
suggested that states owe certain obligations
to the "international community" as a whole.
These obligations are "erga omnes," according
to the Court, and all states have a legal interest
in their protection. Erga omnes obligations
include acts of aggression, genocide, and
violations of the basic rights of the human
person, such as slavery or racial discrimination. States violating these norms offend the
"international community," rather than the
"community of states"

The concept of jus cogens denies the possibility that international law derives in any significant sense from the simple will or consent of states. As described in the treaty,
however, jus cogens creates a new category of
fundamental norms "accepted by the international community of states as a whole."
This "international community" transcends
individual states, and may encourage the
development of multilateral forums to recognize and articulate inchoate standards of
international law.

Human rights have played this overarching
role in international law at least since the days
of that first great promoter of state sovereignty, Jean Bodin, who admitted that rulers
should be replaced by outside intervention
when they cease to serve the common good
of the people (Jean Bodin, Six livres de la
r~publique 11.5.609 (1576)). Vattel considered it
an act of "justice and generosity" for William
of Orange to protect the English against
James II (Vattel, II.iv.56). However much
princes and the "community of states" may
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benefit from noninterference, international
law has always recognized an obligation of
the "international community" to liberate
oppressed peoples from those that abuse
them. The principles of self-determination and
colonial liberation reflect this basic truth.
Attempts to confine international disputes
into a purely bilateral framework ignore the
principles that gave rise to international law in
the first place. Certain obligations are erga omnes
because they regard the very existence or
basic justice of the international community as
a whole. This is not strictly speaking a community of states, but rather a community of
humanity acting through states to develop
societies and protect their common good and
basic freedoms. When norms are created to
serve the international community, it makes
sense that community as a whole should retain
the right to enforce them.

The sources of international law in justice
and the common good of humanity have not
changed for centuries, since peoples first entered
into commerce with their neighbors. New
vehicles for discovering these realities emerge,
and are useful, most recently through multilateral forums such as those provided by the
United Nations. Changed circumstances should
never obscure the fundamental truths on which
the law of nations rests, and without which
international law would lose its efficacy and
moral influence on states.

Conclusion
The primary source of international law
has always been the law of nature, applied
to nations. Conventions, custom, legal principles and the opinions of publicists all seek
to ar-ticulate this preexisting truth, or its
corollaries made salient by historical circumstances. The recent turn to multilateral
action through the International Law Commission and other United Nations agencies
creates a new vehicle for systematizing this
sort of deliberation. This is no departure, but
rather a confirmation of the traditional
sources of international law.
Recent scholarship by authors such as
Jonathan Charney has identified some confusion in the concept of an "international
community." Is it a community of persons or
of states? The doctrines of jus cogens and erga
omnes also straddle this delicate issue. But
to justify international law its proponents
have always assumed an underlying community of humanity. Grotius and Vattel supposed that the world's peoples would act
through states. But states are means towards the realization of a just society, not ends
in themselves.

In his famous book, "The Twenty Year
Crisis", E.H. Carr said, "the harmony of
interests...is the natural assumption of a
prosperous and privileged class whose
members have a dominant voice in the
community and are therefore naturally
prone to identify its interests with their
own" (at 80). Is there not something of a
"harmony of interests" idea underlying
Jonathan Charney's essay? I will focus in this
brief comment only on the first paragraph of
Professor Charney's essay while occasionally
drawing on other parts of his argument.
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Comments on International
Law Making

Charney begins:"By definition general
international law serves the public interest, if
for no other reason, that law is directly created
by the international community to serve its
own interests". There is something puzzling
about this sentence. Perhaps, the attempted
erasure of doubt or the unexpressed presence
of conflicting voices. We know that "general
international law" cannot, "by definition",
carry the very definitional weight attributed
to it as a mere phrase. The "because" which
immediately follows reveals that general
international law's service in the public
interest does require an explanation, a defence.
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